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 Although it is practised fairly widely, the concept of compulsory voting 
strikes Americans as strange—on an occasion not long ago I mentioned the practice 
at a meeting of political scientists and was laughed at quite vocally by a senior 
colleague who insisted there was no such thing.  In fact, however, compulsory voting 
is not only a well-known practice, it is a longstanding part of the Anglo-American 
discussion about modes of political activity. 
 The arguments in favour of compulsory voting fall into three categories: 
improved representation of public opinion; benefits of increased levels of 
participation; and positive effects on the practice of electoral politics. (This last, I 
should mention, is my own: I have not seen this particular argument mentioned 
anywhere in the literature). The arguments against compulsory voting fall into two 
broad categories: that it will result in the wrong people casting votes, or that it 
infringes on the liberty of free persons to choose not to participate in political 
decision-making. These are essentially normative arguments—there are also 
instrumental arguments, such as the concern that compulsory voting will aid one 
party or one ideological position at the expense of another. 
 It is important at the outset to recognize that compulsory voting and 
universal participation are overlapping but not necessarily coextensional concepts. 
Compulsory voting combined with effective enforcement mechanisms may, indeed, 
yield very high or even near-universal levels of turnout, but high turnout may occur 
without compulsion or efforts to compel voting may be ineffective. It is important 
not to conflate a policy of compulsory voting with a utopian assumption about the 
effects of such a policy in practice. 
 This ticket is divided into three parts. The first part very briefly reviews 
something of the background of the debate. The second part looks at research on the 
likely effects of introducing compulsory voting in the United States. And the third 
part contains some rather unfocused musings about the normative implications of 
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the first two discussions. In the long run, this discussion is part of a larger project of 
thinking about the ways in which different systems of voting assert claims to 
achieve “representation”; I am hopeful and confident that the comments of the 




The idea of compulsory voting is at least as old as Solon’s Code of the 6th 
century b.c.e., which required that in times of “civil strife” all citizens were required 
to declare support for one side or the other and imposed fines on members of 
council or the popular Assembly who failed to attend meetings. In American history, 
compulsory voting was mandated in both the laws of Plymouth Plantation and the 
Virginia.1 Moving into more modern times, the idea of compulsory voting was 
widely discussed in the late 19th century. 2 In 1893 Belgium became the first country 
to introduce a national system of compulsory voting; at that time, however, 
restrcitvie frachise requirements meant that only 135,00 people out of a population 
of more than 6 million could vote. The same year a proposal for universal manhood 
suffrage was defeated, leading to violent protests. In response, Parliament adopted a 
law that both made voting compulsory and extended the franchis to every male 
citizen over the age of 25. In addition, fathers who paid sufficient rent, small 
proprietors, landowners, university graduates, and holders of professional 
credentials received up to two supplementary votes, a model proposed by John 
Stuart Mill among others. 3 Australia adopted its own compulsory voting law for 
Commonwealth elections n 1918, providing a penalty of up to $50 AUS for 
nonvoting without a “valid and sufficient reason.” In 1924 Australia adopted a 
                                                             
1  Philips, Harry C.J., Compulsory Voting: The Australian Experiment (Western Australia 
Electoral Commission, 2001, 2-33). 
2  Frederick Holls, “Compulsory Voting,” Annals of the American Academiy of the 
Political and Social Sciences 1 (1891): 591. 
3  Frank E. Huggett, Modern Belgium (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969): 34 
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similar law covering all national elections, which was upheld by the High Court in 
1925.4 
 Between 1890 and World War II compulsory voting laws were adopted in 
Belgium, Australia, the Netherlands, Costa Rica, Brazil, Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
while measures were proposed in the U.S. (for public employees), Canada, and 
France. (Phillips, 17-22). Additional laws were introduced but not always enforced 
in Bavaria, Spain, Italy, and a number of Latin American countries.5 
Interestingly, in this period the assumption was that compulsory voting 
would favour conservative parties and candidates and thus help act as a bulwark 
against the threat of socialism.  The argument was that the eligible voters who failed 
to show up at the polls were those too busy with private affairs, precisely the 
population of bourgeois voters whose participation could provide “conservative 
insurance” against the threat of leftist takeover. Fredrick Holls proposed that the 
measure was needed to secure the participation of  “the industrious mechanic, the 
labourious farmer, the  man of study, the merchant and professional man, in short, 
all those who form the substance of the State” while noting “the ignorant and vicious 
as a class are rarely remiss in exercising their privilege.”6  John Broomnall, writing in 
1893, proposed that “the wealthy … habitually neglected their political duties, some 
from dislike to mingle with their humbler fellow citizens.”7 Commentators in 
Canada, Belgium, and the UK similarly appealed to the idea of “conservative 
insurance” as a basis for compelled voting. As a result, the ideological division 
                                                             
4  Practices in local elections vary: Highest level of compulsion in Queensland, NSW 
and Victoria voting is compulsory for residents of the municipality but voluntary fo rate-
payers or peroptry owners outside local government areas, and local voting is voluntary in 
South Australia, Tasmania, and Western Australia. 
5  William Robson, “Compulsory Voting,” Political Science Quarterly 38 (1923) no. 4: 
577; Alfred Nerincz, “Compulsory Voting in Belgium,” Annals of Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. 
Sci 18, no. 2 (1902): Phillips, 87-88 
6  Holls, 1891, at 589. 
7  Broomhall, “Copmulsory Voting,” Annals of th eAmer. Acad. Of Political and Social 
Sciences 3, no. 5 (1893): 623 (11).  
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tended to fall between parties on the Left who sought universal but non-compulsory 
voting, and parties on the Right who sought compulsory voting combined with a 
narrow franchise. Indeed, as late as 1963 a commentator used the term 
“conservative insurance” to suggest that compulsory voting would be a safeguard 
against the looming danger of women’s suffrage.8 
Interestingly, in more modern periods the opposite argument has been 
widely accepted.9 Both proponents and opponents of compulsory voting have 
assumed that the effect of introducing such a practice would be to benefit Left-
leaning parties and policy positions. That assumption plays a key role in the 
discussion, and therefore warrants more careful attention. 
 
II. The Left or Right Advantage Effect of CV 
Repeated efforts to test the claim of a Left or Right advantage from CV have 
yielded inconclusive results. James DiNardo concluded that the introduction of CV in 
the United States would significantly increase turnout, and that the result would be 
participation by a significantly greater number of low SES voters. But he also 
concluded that such voters would be likely to have higher partisan defection rates 
than current voters, such that their addition to the ranks of voters would benefit 
whichever party was in the minority. In particular, he found an historical effect that 
in congressional elections in Democratic-dominated districts there was a negative 
correlation between turnout and Democratic vote. But Di Nardo also found that this 
effect weakened through the 1960s.10 DiNardo’s hypothesis was that this pattern 
                                                             
8  Tingsten, Herbert, Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics (JNew Jersey: 
Totowa Press, 1963, 188) 
9  Lijphart, Arend. 1997. “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s 
Unresolved Dilemma.” American Political Science Review 
91(1):1–14. 
 
10  DeNardo, James. 1980. “Turnout and theVote: The Joke’s on the 
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might reflect a general weakening of partisan identification, but it is worth 
considering the possibility that the effect was a result of the disintegration of the 
“solid South” and its realignment toward ultimate Republican domination, an 
argument supported by the findings of Robert Erikson, who found that aftger 1965 
increased turnout in Southern races benefitted Democrats.11 
In a 2003 study, Citrin et. al. tested the hypothesis that such advantages 
would have any electoral significance.  Citrin and his colleagues extrapolated 
preferences of non-voters using “determinants of electoral choice” of known voters 
used to estimate preferences of nonvoters to determine whether there are 
differences in partisan preferences, then extrapolate to determine the effects of 
including more voters in an election, relying on exit polls, using Senate elections 
from 1994, 1996, 1998.  Finds significant differences in preferences among voters 
and nonvoters, but also that, “Taken as a whole the research using aggregate data 
suggests a complex relationship between turnout and outcomes” that “varies over 
time and across electoral contexts.” Most importantly for their purposes, Citrin et. al. 
Finds no likely significant effect on Senate elections in the 1990s despite measurable 
left movement in composition of electorate, due to absence of close races at the 
statewide level.12 
 These findings are plausible, but non-conclusive. For one thing, Citrin did not 
study the plausible effects of CV on non-statewide races—local or national--nor the 
possibility of effects in hypothetical closer races. A more sophisticated approach, 
focusing on interaction effects, was undertaken in a large-N comparative study 
conducted by Christian Jensen and Jae-Jae Spoon.13 Jensen and Spoon studies 9 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Democrats.”AmericanPolitical ScienceReview 74(2):406–20     
11  Erikson, Robert. 1995. “State Turnout and Presidential Voting: 
A Closer Look.” American Politics Quarterly 23(4):387–96. 
12  Citrin, Jack, Eric Schickler, John Sides, “What If Everyone Voted? Simulating the 
Impact of Increased Turnout in  Senate Elections” AJPS 47 (2003): 75-90. 
13  Christian B. Jensen and Jae-Jae Spoon, “Compelled without direction: Compulsory 
Voting and Party System Spreading” Electoral Studies 30 (2011): 700-11. 
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countries with CV systems in comparison with 34 countries lacking such systems. 
One of the questions in which Jensen and Spoon were interested was the extent to 
which increased participation by voters of a given ideology would result in an 
increased likelihood in the adoption of policies favored by that group.  That is, the 
question of the effects of CV have to be considered at three distinct stages: 
participation, election of representatives, and adoption of policies. As M. Franklin 
observes, “[Candidates] may have different policies, but neither can be sure of being 
able to put their policies into practice even should they win. Making voting 
compulsory would not change this.”14  
Following up on this suggestion, Jenner and Spoon hypothesize that a system of 
CV increased veto points in the policymaking process by producing a greater range 
of parties and party ideology. Jensen and Spoon suggested the possibility that the 
implementation of CV might  result in the mobilization of voters whose patterns of 
preference expression would be inconsistent with the previous voting population. 
”If the least informed voters are both the last ones to vote and vote differently than 
better informed, more likely voters, then requiring people to vote could have very 
different consequences for elections than simply increasing the level of turnout by 
some amount.”15 This is not only a riff on the idea that less informed voters are more 
prone to party defection, it is a broader claim that mobilizing ill-informed and 
unmotivated voters will essentially yield a random result of added votes, thus 
relatively benefitting smaller parties and creating a “spread effect” in the election of 
candidates (in parliamentary systems). This hypothesis challenges earlier findings 
                                                             
14  Franklin, M., 1999. Electoral engineering and cross-national turnout 
differences: what role for compulsory voting? British Journal of 
Political Science 29, 205–224. 
15  Jensen and Spoon, supra. At 702 (citing literature on “wrong” or poorly motivated 
voting by uninformed voters and a Belgian study finding correlation between parties and 
policy preference least defined by voters who vote because of CV and not otherwise, plus 
literature showing CV mobilizes less informed, less interested voters. 
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of a negative relationship between CV and small party success,16 but is consistent 
with findings that plurality systems (which are characterized by low turnout) 
discourage less informed voters from participating.17  
To gain better purchase on the effects of CV, Jensen and Spoon test for 
interaction effects and isolated the separating influences of CV and high turnout. 
Their findings were that holding turnout constant CV harms the Left and small 
parties, but when CV is accompanied by significant increases in turnout—and when 
high turnout exists in the absence of CV—Left parties and small parties benefit. The 
implications for Left-Right politics are that the introduction of CV will benefit Left in 
situation of prior low turnout and a responsive increase in voting (e.g. by sanctions 
or social norms).  
The researchers further hypothesized that the benefits to Left parties would 
likely be undercut by the spread effects of mobilizing ill-informed voters, on the 
theory that a greater number of small parties in a coalition represents increased 
ideological range within governments and at the same time leads to an increase in 
the number of veto players, resulting in “increased policy stability, decreased 
government duration, and increased judicial and bureaucratic autonomy.”18  
With respect to small parties, the researchers again found that interaction effects 
complicate the picture. A significant “spread” effect was found only in cases where 
CV was accompanied by the highest levels of turnout; CV by itself, holding turnout 
constant, produced no significant effect. Interestingly, high turnout in the absence of 
CV was associated with a reduced ideological range in governing (708). As the 
authors note, “CV affects these variables at both the low and high ranges of turnout. 
                                                             
16  Birch, Susan. Full Participation: A Cmoparative Study of Compulsory Voting (Univ. 
Press, NY) 
17  Fisher, Stephen D., Laurence Lessard-Phillips, Sara B. Hobolt, John Curtice, 
“Disengaging Voters: Do Plurality Systems Discourage the Less Knowledgeable from 
Voting?,” Electoral Studies 27 (2008): 89-104. 
18  Ibid., On veto points as an operating concept in the analysis of governmental 




Importantly, the effect of high voter turnout in the absence of CV has the opposite 
effect on both dependent variables. Thus, these findings show that CV conditions the 
effect of turnout and turnout conditions the effect of CV. This demonstrates that 
there is something qualitatively different about compulsory voting rules as 
compared to only increasing turnout.”19  
In some ways, Jensen and Spoon’s findings do not easily translate to the U.S. For 
one thing, we do not employ proportional election of parliamentary representatives 
from multi-member districts. Equally important, the assumption that non-voters are 
to the Left of voters may not hold true.  
On the question of the effects of plurality rather than proportional systems, 
Fisher et. al. find a robust correlation between plurality systems and low turnout. 
This correlation holds even testing for a variety of possible interacting variables 
including the proportion of safe seats, levels of satisfaction with the existing 
government, number or range of parties, and recruitment efforts. Additional control 
variables that were tested included lack of political knowledge, institutional form, 
and multiple social and economic characteristics. The authors’ explanatory 
hypothesis is that voters with low levels of knowledge are more sensitive to 
electoral system effects than voters with higher knowledge levels.” Those with high 
levels of knowledge in contrast are little affected by the character of the electoral 
system. Moreover we have demonstrated that this finding is not simply a 
consequence of the fact that differences in turnout are likely to be lower when 
overall turnout is higher. Rather, turnout is lower under plurality rule because those 
who in any election are less motivated to vote are particularly discouraged from 
doing so with the consequence that not only is the level of turnout lower under 
plurality rule, but that inequalities in turnout are greater too.”20 
On the question of whether American non-votes display the same differences 
with voters as are found in the large N comparative studies, Leighley and Nagler’s 
                                                             
19  Ibid. 705-07, 708. 
20  Fisher et. al. supra. n. 17. 
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study Who Votes Now?, a follow-up to Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s 1972 classic, 
produces important results. Leighley and Nagler finds that with two notable 
exceptions the hypothesis that American non-voters are consistently to the Left of 
voters is incorrect. For example, differences on the question of “women’s role in 
society” that were sharp in 1972 have nearly entirely disappeared by 2004, while on 
the question of “government aid to blacks” there is a significant difference between 
voters and non-voters in 200 and an even more significant difference in the opposite 
direction in 2004. On party identification, Independents are overrepresented among 
non-voters by 14.5% in 2004, novoters are less likely than liberals to self-describe 
as “liberal” or “very liberal” by a combined 5.1% total and on a range of other issues 
non-voters appear as conservative as or more conservative than voters.  
The major exceptions have to do with class-based or economic issues, and 
abortion. The researchers find substantial over-representation of conservative 
views and an increase in that imbalance from 1972-2004. On abortion, there is a 
shift from underrepresenting to overrepresenting opposition to abortion rights; on 
government-provided employment, government services, and government-
provided health insurance there is a substantial increase in the overrepresentation 
of conservative views.21 On these issues non-voters always more liberal than voters, 
with widely varying degrees of different on government health insurance (spikes in 
1988 and 1996) and much more consistency in the level of different on the other 
two after 1988, at right around the time the Democratic Party’s leadership tacked to 
the Right. This pattern is consistent with the authors’ suggestion that the increase in 
the difference between voters and non-votes on economic issues may reflect a 
narrowing of available policy choices, and more particularly in light of the general 
shift of both parties to the Right the increasing unavailability of any party proposing 
Left-oriented alternatives. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that despite the dramatic increase since 1972 in 
                                                             
21  In 2004, non-voter support for government-guaranteed jobs at 42.9% while voters 
support level is 31.0%; on government-provided health insurance non-voter support is 
51.5% while voter support is 44.3%. Data taken from tables in appendices. 
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racial and ethnic plurality and economic inequality, the authors find little evidence 
of persistent differences in voting by race, and the difference in turnout between 
wealthy and non-wealthy voters has remained stable. That is, the voting population 
skews wealthier and older than the non-voting population, but not to a greater 
degree than was true in earlier decades. 22  
 As was noted earlier, the translation of policy preferences to policy outcomes 
is not direct, particularly in the statewide elections studied by Citrin et. al. It is 
plausible that the Leighley and Nagler’s findings have policy implications for local, 
district-wide, or national elections as well as for closely contested Senate elections. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that separate research has pointed to a correlation 
between district turnout and levels of federal spending.23 
 
III. Comments on Findings 
Franklin, M.N., 2004. Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral 
Competition in Established Democracies since 1945. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge – voting is determined by patterns of socialization, 
themselves influenced by levels of education, etc. 
 
 The discussion thus far has focused on the political significance and potential 
consequences of CV. There is also the question of whether such a system might be 
desirable or undesirable for other reasons. There is not a substantial and obvious 
constitutional problem. As one group of authorities puts it, “If the state can force you 
to serve on a jury, enlist in the army, and separate your trash for recycling purposes, 
                                                             
22  Leighley, Jan E. and Johnathan Nagler, Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, 
Inequality, and Turnout in the United States (Princeton 2014), 35-45, 139-46. 
23  Hill, Kim Quaile & Jan E. Leighley, “The Policy Consequences of Class Bias in 
American State Electorates," American Journal of Political Science 36 (1992): 351-365; 
Martin, Paul S., “Voting's Rewards: Voter Turnout, Attentive Publics, and Congressional 
Allocation of Federal Money." American Journal of Political Science 47 (2003):110-127. 
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the state can presumably make you show up and vote.”24 Similar analogies are relied 
upon by writers considering existing systems of compulsory voting to conclude that 
there is no rights-based objection to the practice. 25 On the other hand, there is a 
frequently expressed belief that CV is politically unpalatable to Americans for 
reasons of a loosely defined “political culture.” As one commentator put it in 1954, 
“many of the ideas connected with the general theme of a duty to vote belong 
properly to the totalitarian camp and are out of place in the vocabulary of liberal 
democracy.”26). Richard Hasen observes, “Although the government tells people 
what to do all the time—file an income tax return, serve on a jury, register in the 
Selective Service Program, separate trash—hackles rise when compulsory voting is 
mentioned. I have no good explanation for this phenomenon…” (Hasen, 2135) There 
is one notable judicial opinion suggesting that CV might be constitutionally suspect. 
In Kansas City v. Whipple (1896) (Mo. Sup. Ct., never appealed) Chief Justice Brace 
rejected the idea stating, “Voting is not such a duty as may be enforced by 
compulsory legislation” but must be “free, according to the dictates of his own 
untrammelled will.” And as we have seen, there are a variety of arguments to the 
effect that limiting participation is a positive good in that it excludes ill-informed 
voters from participating. 
 On the other hand, there are a series of potential benefits to CV that should 
be considered entirely aside from any predictions of the effects on policy outcomes. 
One Australian writer listed the following arguments in favor of compulsory voting 
as it is practiced in his country: 
- the benefits of participation 
                                                             
24  Lowenstein, Daniel Hayes, Richard L. Hasen, Daniel P. Tokaji, Election Law Cases and 
Materials (Carolina Academic Press Durham NC 2008). For a discussion of potential First 
Amendment objections concluding that these would be without merit, see Hasen,  Richard 
L., “Voting Without Law?” 144 Univ. Penn. L. Rev. 2135 (1996) at 2175 n.163.  
25  See, e.g., Hill, Lisa, “On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to ‘Vote’: the 
Australian Case” Political Studies 50 (2002): 80-___. 
26  Morris-Jones, W.H.,  “In Defense of Apathy-Some doubts on the Duty to Vote” 
Political Studies 2 (1954): 25-37, 25. 
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- genuine expression of the national will 
- conservative insurance 
- political education of citizens 
- preserve principle of representation 
- performance of civic duty 
- counter to corruption of vote-buying.27  
And one might add another, unmentioned advantage: the introduction of CV would 
presumably do away with electoral strategies of discouraging and/or suppressing 
the participation of voters assumed to be likely supporters of one’s opponent. Going 
even further, the existence of CV would make it much more difficult to justify the 
impositions of onerous barriers to participation. 
Aside from “conservative insurance,” none of these necessarily presume a 
particular effect on policy. One particularly interesting emphasis is on the principle 
of representation. Numerous commentators have observed that the American 
system of elections is far from democratic; the usual Madisonian response is that we 
are a representative republic rather than a democracy. But if that is the justification 
for the system, then a particular description of what is “represented” and an 
assessment of the degree to which the existing system achieves that 
“representation” would seem to be in order. The Madisonian model of Federalist 10 
famously speaks of representation as a “filter” to allow elite opinion to rise to the 
top; that is an argument that favors restricting the franchise, and perhaps—along 
the 19th century models discussed at the outset—making voting mandatory for 
certain classes of persons or as a condition of receipt of a benefit (e.g., those holding 
public positions, publicly granted licenses). The argument that CV is valuable 
precisely because it effectively expands the franchise, a very anti-Madisonian 
position, speaks to a different conception of “representative” government. That 
theoretical and normative problem has to be addressed and a position staked out 
before one can make a plausible argument for or against CV. 
                                                             
27  Phillips, 106. 
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The larger question is whether CV would enhance or degrade voters’ sense of 
attachment to the political system and the consequent legitimacy of government in 
general. This is arguably a pressing question in the United States, where the decline 
in trust in government institutions and the lack of satisfaction with the democratic 
process may be said to be approaching the level of an existential crisis. Hill, in her 
2006 study, argued that CV increased “representation, legitimacy, and political 
equality”. It is possible, of course, that there is a reversal of cause and effect such 
that nations likely to adopt CV systems are already informed by political cultures 
that favor participation and legitimacy, cultures that are reinforced by the effects of 
CV laws. But it is also possible that the causal arrow sometimes points in the 
opposite, more Rousseauian direction: that compelling political participation can 
affect civic culture over time and produce positive effects. The loss of government 
efficiacy by the proliferation of veto points might be more than overcome by the 
benefits of increased legitimacy.   
This discussion of the normative implications of CV are encouraged by the 
finding that even in the absence of enforcement CV increases turnout. This 
observation leads Hasen to conclude that CV laws function as articulations of social 
norms rather than as coercive measures.28 A nice gloss on this point is provided by 
Jensen and Spoon’s finding that CV has stronger effects where it is an element of a 
constitutional mandate rather than an ordinary statute.29 Thus the debate over CV 
ends where debates about the American system so often do: in a consideration of 
the relationship between the norms of our constitutional order and the norms of our 
political culture, and the question of how the two can best be made mutually 
supportive—or at least mutually intelligible.  
 
                                                             
28  Hasen, 2170-71. 
29  Jensen and Spoon, 709. 
